EVIL AND NATURAL CAUSATION

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April.2022

Abstract: *What has been discussed so far are the questions that Corona and evil pose to religious teachings. But some of the problems that Corona creates for religious beliefs go back to some philosophical foundations. The next two discussions deal with these topics: In the discussion of supplication, as well as Qadha and Qadar, as well as the knowledge and power of the infallible, we explained that God and the infallibles can destroy Corona and can do so in two ways, one using natural causes, and the other through violations of natural causality, and miracles.Now the question arises that if natural causation is a part of the principle of causality and the principle of causality cannot be violated, how can God and the infallibles intervene in the world and eliminate evil through miracles, thus violating natural causality?*

Key words: Qadha, Qadar, natural causation

In response, it should be said that God's intervention via miracles and violation of natural causes does not violate the principle of causality,

because when God interferes in the world through unnatural means and creates a phenomenon in the world, this phenomenon is not without cause, rather its cause is God. What the principle of causation and causalitysay is that every phenomenon and effect requires a cause. And here too, there is a cause, and that is God.

Therefore, the origin of the aforementioned problem is not the principle of causality, but natural causation. The problem is that when God commands, for example, that the fire be cold and healthy for Abraham and the fire does not burn Abraham (a.s.), here the natural cause, i.e., the essential burning of fire, is violated, not the principle ofCausality.

The answer is that the aforementioned problem is mooted based only on a few interpretations of natural causality, not all of its interpretations.

There are at least four interpretations of natural causality in Islamic philosophy and theology.

These four interpretations are: |

1. The Ash'arite doctrine of God's custom ('Adat Allah') and Malebranche Occasionalism.

2. Theory of the Necessaryinfluence of natural causes or the Natural Essentialism of Aristotle and Ibn-Rushd.

3. The Theory of forms (صورت)[1] and accidents (عرض)[2]of Active Intellect in Islamic Philosophy.

4. The Imamiah and Mu'tazila Theory of the Sunnah ofAllah.

It seems that based on the first and fourth perspectives, the realization ofmiracles and the violation of natural causality does not create problems and the problem

rests only on the second and third theories. Now we shall explain these four theories.

1. The Ash'arite and Occasionalist philosophers including Malebranche, believe that the only real originator is God. The Ash'aritesay:

لا فاعل له على حقيقته إلا الله تعالى.[3]

Malebranche says:

God created everything and He is the One who preserves them... and He is the One who knows everything and does it.[4]

Regarding natural causation,based on Unity of Divine Acts (*Tauhid-e-Af'ali*) andactionsspecificto God, this group believes that God creates both fire and burning and that God can create fire without burning, and burning without fire.

In response to the question that if this is the case, then why is there burning when there is fire, they say that when fire comes in contact with the cotton, it is God's habit that it causes the cotton to burn. In Malebranche's words, when wood is put on fire, God makes the wood to burn. Ghazali while rejecting the Natural Essentialism theory of Islamic philosophers, says:

فإن اقترانها لما سبق من تقدير الله سبحانه، يخلقها على التساوق لا لكونه ضروريا فى نفسه، غير قابل للفوت ، بل فى المقدور خلق الشبع دون الأكل، وخلق الموت دون جز الرقبة، وإدامة الحياة، مع جز الرقبة، وهلم جرا إلى جميع المقترنات. وأنكر الفلاسفة إمكانه، وادعوااستحالته.

The symmetry of natural phenomena such as fire and burning is related to God's Decree, Who creates them symmetrically, and there is no essentialism and inseparability between fire and burning. Rather, God is able to satiate without eating, can cause to die without cutting off thethroat, and prolong life in spite of cutting offthe throat and so on.The philosophers

deny this possibility and consider it impossible.[5]

Malebranche says:

"None of the natural causes are real causes and are only periodic and symmetrical causes."[6] Ghazali, in rejecting natural causality in the sense of philosophers' essentialism, says that their only reason is that when there is fire, there is burning, while observing something burning in the fire only proves the symmetry of fire and cotton burning, not that fire is the cause of burning cotton.This matter is the same as Hume's dispute on natural causation. He says:

ليس لهم دليل، إلا مشاهدة حصول الاحتراق عند ملاقاة النار، و المشاهدة تدل على الحصول عندها، و لا تدل على الحصول بها ، و أنهلا علة له سواها.

They have no reason, except for observing the occurrence of burning when encountering the fire, but an observation indicating the occurrence of burning close to the fire does not mean that its occurrence is due to the fire and that there is no other cause than fire.[7]

In the discussion that follows, Ghazali mentions the same Hume analysis of the origin of the conception of natural causality and the necessary productive relationship between fire and heat, stating that there is a psychological principle in us humans which is that we are accustomed to repeatedly observe the symmetry of fire and burning and the primacy of fire on burning objects, thus ruling that fire is the necessary cause of burning, while there is no logical reason to this. Ghazali says:

الم ندع أن هذه الأمور واجبة ، بل هى ممكنة، يجوز أن تقع، و يجوز أن لا تقع، و استمرار العادة بها، مرة بعد أخرى، يرسخ فى أذهاننا، جريانها على وفق العادة الماضية ترسيخا لا تنفک عنه؛

"We do not reckon such natural matters as compulsory and necessary, but as a possibility, i.e., it is possible for them to occur or not

to occur, and the persistence of successive habits about them establishes the flow of the past habits in our minds in a way that doesn't give up on them." [8]

To prove his theory, Malebranche argues that there is no connection between fire and burning, rather no phenomenon can possibly exist but if the necessary existent (*Wajib al-Wujud*) or the absolute power, makes a will and intends something, then that thing will necessarily happen. He says:

It is clear that no object, whether big or small, can move by itself... (Also] we don't find any necessary relation between one's will and the movements of objects... But when one thinks about the conception of God, i.e., the Absolute Perfect Being, and consequently the Absolute Power, such a link is formed between God's will and the motion of all bodies, which means it's impossible for an object not to move when God wants it to move.

So, it must be said that only His will can move objects. [9]

According to the theory of'Adat Allah' (God's custom) and Occasionalism, there is no difference between kindling a fire or cooling a fire, because both acts are carried out by God's will and authority. Therefore, God's intervention through natural causes or through miracles is both possible, just as God can give the Infallibles the knowledge and power to use natural and unnatural means to destroy dangers (evil) like Corona.

In criticizing this view, it should be said that it defies common sense to say that fire has no role in the burning of cotton, and that it is God who burns the cotton. The impact of objects on each other can be found in human actions via intuitive science. For example, when I decide or intend to move my hand, my hand moves with an intuitive and clear awareness of conscience and perception.

Of course, it should be noted that when it comes to natural causes we may err in its instances, for example, factors A, B and C are effective in the emergence of a condition, but we only recognize factors A and B as causes and fail to recognize the effect of factor C, but this is still not a valid reason to deny the principle of effects and natural effects.

It’s also possible that there is no essential relation between natural causes and their effects, and that effects of natural causes may not be essential, but this is no reason to deny the principle of effect.

2. In contrast to the theory of Occasionalism and 'Adat Allah' (God's custom), stands the theory of naturalism and essentialism of Aristotle and Ibn Rushd.According to this view, the nature of natural objects necessarily requires properties that cannot fail to materialize.Proponents of this view consider natural causation as necessary for the principle of general causation and denial of natural causality as a denial of the principle of causality. In response to Ghazali's hitch, Ibn Rushd says about natural causation:

قلت: أما إنكار وجود الأسباب الفاعلة التى تشاهد فى المحسوسات فقول سفسطانى، والمتكلم بذلک إما جاحد بلسانه لما فى جنانه، وإما منقاد لشبهة سفسطانية عرضت له فى ذلک. ومن ينفى ذلک فليس يقدر أن يعترف أن كل فعل لا بد له من فاعل.

In reply to Ghazali, we say: "To deny the existence of active causes that we see in sensations is a fallacy and a misconception, and the announcer either denies with his tongue something that he accepts in his heart or submits to a fallacious doubt that has arisen for him. And one who denies natural causality cannot believe that every action has a performer.[10]

He goes on to find fault with the first theory in a way that objects have essences that require actions,

and if we deny this innateness and actions from objects, we have denied the objects themselves because the objects are these very essences and actions. He says:

وأيضا فماذا يقولون فى الأسباب الذاتية التى لا يفهم الموجود إلا بفهمها، فإنه من المعروف بنفسه أن للأشياء ذوات وصفات هى التى اقتضت الأفعال الخاصة بموجود موجود، وهى التى من قبلها اختلفت ذوات الأشياء و أسماؤها وحدودها؛

Also, what do they say about the intrinsic causes, where beings are perceived only via their comprehension? Because it is known that objects have essences and attributes that require specific actions for each being, and it is due to them that the essence, name and definition of objects differ from each other.[11]

This view is essentially Aristotle's view. Aristotle limits causation to natural causation and does not ascribe causation to God because he equates God with reason. He renders natural causation to two things, namely "On Coming to Be and Passing Away" (creation and decay) and motion. In creation and decay (On Coming to Be and Passing Away), the substantial form separates from matter and a new substantial form is replaced in the matter, for example, the form of a seed or an inanimate thing disappears and a bush and plant come into being. In a movement that occurs in the sphere of only three forms; size, quality and place, the essence or substance loses its form and accepts a new form. Natural objects are the cause of these substantial and accidental changes. For example, the grain becomes a plant due to suitable soil, weather and sunlight, and gradually changes in size and color. In fact, it is the essence and nature of soil and water that produce such essential effects, and these effects are not the work of God. He says:

How can we justify the movement of light and heavy objects in their natural position? The reason

behind these movements is that each of those objects has a natural tendency to some specific place, which is exactly the meaning of lightness and heaviness.[12]

According to this view, miracles and God's intervention through unnatural ways are not possible. Therefore, in response to the concern that divine miracles would then remain unsolved, such as the reason why Ibrahim was not burned by fire but instead was cooled by it, Ibn Rushd says: Miracle is a religious and divine affair that is beyond human intellect and we are ignorant of its cause. In matters of Shari'ah, one should simply submit themselves and avoid arguing about it:

وأما ما نسبه من الاعتراض على معجزة إبراهيم ٧ فشىء لم يقله إلا الزنادقة من أهل الإسلام. فإن الحكماء من الفلاسفة ليس يجوز عندهم التكلم ولا الجدل فى مبادئ الشرائع... و لذلک يجب على كل إنسان أن يسلم مبادئ الشريعة وأن يقلد فيها ... فالذى يجب أن يقال فيها أن مبادئها هى أمور إلهية تفوق العقول الإنسانية فلا بد أن يعترف بها مع جهل أسبابها، ولذلک لا نجد أحدا من القدماء تكلم فى المعجزات مع انتشارها وظهورها فى العالم لأنها مبادئ تثبيت الشرائع؛

As for what Ghazali attributed to philosophers about the miracle of Ibrahim (a.s.) is not correct; it is somethingthat only the heretics among Muslims have said.Philosophers too do not think it is appropriate to debate religious issues like miracles.... and every Muslim should submit to religious affairs and strictly follow his religious leader... What should be said in such cases is that these matters are divine matters, beyond human intellect and despite ignorance about their cause, one must acknowledge them. Therefore, in the past, even though the issue of miracles was well-known to all, they refrained from discussing it because these are among the principles that prove the *Shari'ah*.[13]

This reply is fideism and a faith-based reply that demands submission, even if it is a religious matter that runs counter to reason.

This answer is unacceptable, and if natural causality is necessary and rational, religion cannot say contrary to it.

Ibn Rushd’s response is that fie is expedient to burn, but the cause is complete when there aren’t any obstacles, and God may raise an obstacle to prevent the burning of Ibrahim, based on the essentialist interpretation of natural causation. Of course, this answer goes against the apparent meaning of the verse, where God commands the fire to cool rather than burn. In *Kitab Fasl al-Maqal*, Ibn Rushd argues that philosophy has a higherstatus than religion, and if there appears a conflict between apparent Shari'ah and philosophy, the apparent Shari'ah should be interpreted on the basis of philosophy.[14]

The drawback of the second theory is that it is neither explicit, nor has a concrete rationalreason, nor is it compatible with narrative evidence.

The reason why it is not explicit is that the intellect does not see any essential connection between fire and burning, and is therefore not thought to be impossible for fire not to burn, even though it always does.

Ibn Rushd's reasoning that if we deny natural causality, the principle of causation will be totally denied is not true because a person who asserts that fire may not burn or that there is no necessary relationship between fire and burning believes that if burning occurs, there must have been a cause, whether the cause is God, something else, or even fire, but it is not incumbent upon fire to burn.

But the argument that if something’s attributes and actions are denied, then the thing itself is denied, is not a valid argument because the denier of natural necessary causation can assert that the thing in question means the same thing without the requisite action, or that the thing in question means both this thing and its action, but that

there is no necessity connecting the two.

The second theory is incompatible with religious texts that speak of miracles. In the noble verse:

قُلْنا يا نارُ كُونِي بَرْداً وَ سَلاماً عَلى إِبْراهِيمَ(*We said, 'O fire! Be cool and safe for Abraham!'*)[15]it apparently means that God commanded the fire to be cool and safe for Ibrahim. Based on inherent natural causality, fire cannot give coolness because fire means something that gives heat and burns, just as a triangle cannot avoid having three sides, because a triangle is a shape that has three sides.

However, according to the second theory, God cannot violate natural causality and, for example, fire cools something instead of heating it, but He can prevent fire from burning by creating a barrier between the fire and something.

3. The theory of form and structure (صورت) and the accidental form (عرض) of the active intellect in Islamic philosophy. Unlike Aristotle who interpreted causality as natural causality, i.e., creating change and movement, Islamic philosophers, based on the analysis of objects in existence and essence, have proposed causation in existence and inferred that the cause gives existence to the effect. They accepted the problems raised by the Ash'areh, that there was no explanation as to how natural causes exist and explained their problems based on rational principles and rules. If a substance like fire gives wood the accidental form (عرض) of burning, this necessarily requires the transfer of the accidental form from one substance to another substance, which according to the rule of "transfer of impossible accidental forms" is not possible, because the substance at the very moment of transfer from one substance to another substance will be without substance, which is impossible, and if the substance of fire itself enters the substance of wood, the

interference of the objects will occur which is again impossible. Farabi says:

الأعراض و الصور المادية وجودها فى ذواتها هى وجودها فى موضوعاتها فلا يصح عليها انتقال عن موضوعاتها بل تبطل عنها؛

Material accidents and forms, their existence is inherently their existence in their subjects and so, it is not possible for them to deviate from their subjects, which, if that happened, will be destroyed. [16]

In explanation of Farabi's phrase, some have said:

The existence of "Araz" outside is its existence in the subject, such that the merit of existence in the subject is the merit of its essence. Therefore, from the point of view of reason, it is not possible to have "Araz" without a subject. As such, if it is assumed that the "Araz" is to be transferred from one subject to another, then the very nature of transfer requires that the "Araz" leave the first subject and gets transferred to the second subject, and under the situation when the "Araz" abandons the first subject and has not yet passed to the second subject, it is necessary that at this moment the "Araz" has an existence outside without the subject, whereas the merit of existence in the subject is an inherent merit for the level of "Araz" and its detachment from the subject is not permissible in any way, because this separation, even for a moment, invalidates it, and this is the same meaning that Farabi has referred to in his analytical treatise. [17]

So, fire can neither create burning nor can it transmit its combustion to the wood. Thus, Islamic philosophers believe that the substantial and accidental forms that appear in objects are gifts of the active intellect. They believe that natural causes are merely the causes of«معدّ»(علت معدّ)[18]and prepare the effect enabling it to derive the

substantial or accidental form from the active intellect.

There are several differences between the theory of Ash'areh and that of the philosophers. First, the Ash'aris believed that God creates substantial and accidental forms in objects with free will and discretion and He is capable of not doing it. But philosophers believe that God, inherently bestows perfections to the active intellect, and that the active intellect inherently imparts these perfections, and that the bestowal of perfections by God and the active intellect is necessary, and not voluntary and willful.

The second difference is that Islamic philosophers try to assign a role to natural causes too, and that role is the role of numbers. Islamic philosophers consider the natural causes stated by Aristotle and Ibn Rushdie to be at the level of « علت معدّ», which only makes natural objects' aptitude to receive the forms (صورت) and "Araz" from "Wahib al-Suwar«واهب الصور» (meaning the giver of forms), which is the tenth intellect in Peripatetic philosophy. Of course, since they do not provide an explanation of how natural objects leave their effects, the causality of numbers is as inexpressible as real causality (علیت حقیقی).[19]

The common point between the Islamic philosophers' theory and the theory of Aristotle and Ibn Rushd is that in both theories, natural causation is necessary, although in the second theory, necessity is derived only from natural causes, but in the third theory, necessity is from "*Wahibal-Suwar*" «واهب الصور». Of course, given the preliminary role and preparatory ground of the natural causes or «علت معدّ», thegoals mentioned for the previous two theories are also applicable to this theory. Common sense regards fire as the cause of burning wood, not God or active intellect. On the other hand, despite the fact that fire burns wood, there is no necessity for this to happen and reason considers it

possible and probable that fire does not burn, because basically whatever occurs in nature are possible realities that can happen differently.

According to this theory, is the natural law prone to violation? As we said, the natural law and the forms in nature go back to active intellect. Accordingly, it was reported in some of Farabi's treatises that he believed the prophet could violate natural laws because he had a link and connection with the active intellect:

Farabi makes different interpretations. He accepts the reliability of miracles because they are a means of proving the prophethood and, despite being supernatural, he doesn't consider them to be inconsistent with natural laws. As the source of these laws is be found in the world of celestial spheres and intellects equipping the terrestrial world, and once we get connected to this world, we experience extraordinary events, and just as mentioned before, the Prophet possesses spiritual power through which he is connected with the active intellect and it is by virtue of this union and connection that he causes the cloud to rain, splits the moon, turns the staff into a serpent or heals the blind and the leper.[20]

Ibn Sina also considers miracles just like the effects of spirits![21]

Of course, it is not explained how the Prophet affects the active intellect, like in what way the « علت معدّ» affects the active intellect.

4. The theory of *Sunnat Allah* (the 'way of Allah') of the Imamiyah and Mu'tazila: The view of most Imamiyah and Mu'tazila theologians is that natural causality is a real phenomenon and that when wood burns, its cause is the fire, but this burning is placed in the fire by God, and therefore, burning by fire is not a necessary issue. In fact, burning fire is a God-made tradition,

and therefore, God can obstruct this tradition in miracles.

Unlike the first and third viewpoints, and in agreement with the second viewpoint, the fourth viewpoint ascribes effects such as burning to fire, not to God or active intellect. However, contrary to the second view, it believes that God has placed the characteristic and power of burning in the fire, and therefore the relationship between fire and burning is not a necessary event and God can take off the characteristic of burning from fire and give it the property of cooling.

The Imamiyah and Mu'tazila's views on this subject can be found from the various topics in theology, the most important of which is the discussion of miracles. From the theologians' point of view, one of the principles of miracle is its supernatural norm (خارق عادت). By عادت, is meant natural causation, such as fire that burns, and what is meant by خرق عادت (breaking the norm) is an act contrary to natural causality, such as cooling the fire. Sayyid Murtaza, cites the example of the sunrise in the west and the birth of a child without marriage between a man and woman.[22]

Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani, in his criticism of philosophical causality and its characteristics such as سنخیت (analogy) and ضرورت (necessity), expounds the theory of causality based on divine making (جعل الهی) as follows:

This analogy that is talked about between cause and effect is when they say that the essences of objects are مجعول بالعرض and they also resort to «ما جعل الله المشمشة مشمشة بل اوجدها» ("God does not make apricot an apricot, but creates it"), but if they set forth this probability that the essences too are مجعول بالاستقلال, just as it is said in قُلْنَا يَا نَارُ كُونِي بَرْدًا وَسَلَامًا عَلَى إِبْرَاهِيمَ(*We said, 'O fire! Be cool and safe for Ibrahim*) that apparently, the fire will turn cool and healthy while maintaining its identity of burning and there isn't any change in essence, and just like

the divine tradition (sunnah) is based on fire burning, this tradition (sunnah) changesby God's command forever or is permitted in particular cases. When we considerthe possibility that it is even more appropriatewith the power of God, the principle of this analogyturns meaningless.[23]

JāḥiẓMu'tazili, in proving natural causality and the effect and influence of natural objects, says as against the Ash'areh that:

أمور العالم ممزوجة بالمشاكلة و منفردة بالمضادة، و بعضها علة البعض، كالغيث علته السحاب والسحاب علته الماء والرطوبة، وكالحب علته الزرع، والزرع علته الحب، والدجاجة علتها البيضة، والبيضة علتها الدجاجة، والإنسان علته الإنسان؛

Objects in the world are linked together by compatibility and are separated by incompatibility and conflict, and some of them are the cause of the others, like rain is caused by the clouds, and the clouds are caused by moisture and water, and like grain, which is caused by crops, and crops are caused by grain, and the chicken, which is caused by the egg, and the egg is caused by the chicken, and man is caused by another human.[24]

About the views of three Mu'tazila leaders regarding God's power to create burning and cooling for fire, Ash'ari says:

ثبت ابو الحسين (الصالحى) و أبو الهذيل (العلاف) و من ذهب إلى قولهم، قدرة الله سبحانه على خلق الادراک مع العمى... و وصفا ربهما بالقدرة على أن يجمع بين القطن و النار ولا يقع إحراق... محمد بن عبد الوهاب الجبائى .. يصف ربه بالقدرة على أن يجمع بين النار والقطن ولا يخلق إحراقا... وإذا جمع بين النار والقطن فعل ما ينفيالاحراق وسكن النار فلم تدخل بين أجزاء القطن فلم يوجد احراق؛

Abū al-Husain Salehi and Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf and the followers of these two views believe in the power of God to createperception in a blind person... And they describe God as being capable of bringing together cotton and fire while cotton does not burn... Muhammad bin 'Abdul-Wahhab al-

Jabaie also... describes God as being able to bring together cotton and fire, while the cotton does not burn, and when He unites the cotton and the fire, He makes the burning of fire disappear and the fire settles down and does not penetrate and burn the cotton. This explanation means that, from the perspective of a group of Mu'tazila there is no inevitable relationship between fire and the burning of cotton, and God can intervene and prevent the fire from burning. This is because it is God's sunnah Who can set burningqualities in the fire and hence can withdraw that quality from the fire and bestow another quality like coolness to the fire.[25]

Qazi Abdul Jabbar Mu'tazili from Basra, the leader of the Mu'tazila in his time, says of the difference between God's action and man's action that God is capable of creating substance (جــوهر) and 'Araz', but human beings can only perform actions such as standing and sitting:

أن خلق أحدنا لا يشبه خلق الله تعالى، فإن خلقه جل و عز يشتمل على الأجسام و الأعراض، و ليس كذلک خلقنا فإنا لا نقدر إلا على هذهالتصرفات التى هى القيام و القعود و ما جرى مجراهما؛

Our creation differs from God's creation, because God's creation includes objects (اجسام) and accidents (اعراض), but our creation is not like that, for we are only capable of behaviors like sitting and standing and things like these.[26]

The same has been narrated by Abul-Qasim al-Balkhi, famous as Ka'bi and one of the prominent figures from the Muʿtazilī theologian from Baghdad who attributes the belief in the creation of objects and accidents to all the Mu'tazila.

Baghdadi says:

زعم الكعبى فى مقالاته أن المعتزلة اجتمعت على أن الله عز و جل شىء لا كالاشياء و أنه خالق الأجسام و الأعراض؛

Ka'bi claimed in his articles that the Mu'tazila agree that God the Almighty is a thing, not like other

things, and that He is the Creator of objects and accidents.[27]

It is well known that Mu'ammar, one of the Mu'tazilites, did not consider God to be the creator of accidents and attributed accidents to the nature of the bodily substances, in contrast to other Mu'tazilites. In this regard, Ash'ari says:

واختلفت المعتزلة هل البارئ قادر على خلق الأعراض وهم فرقتان: فزعم فريق منهم أن الله يقدر على خلق الأعراض وانشائها، و زعمت فرقة أخرى منهم و هم اصحاب «معمر» أنه لا يجوز أن يخلق اللهعرضا ولا يوصف بالقدرة على خلق الأعراض؛

The Mu'tazila disagreed on whether the Creator is capable or not of creating accidents, and they are two groups: One group of them believed that God is able to create accidents, and another group of them,the followers of Muammar, believed that God cannot create accidents, nor is He described as being capable of creating accidents.[28]

Despite this narrative, Khayat Mu'tazili's report on Muammar's theory makes clear that Muammar did not mean that accidents are from the essential essences of bodies; rather, he meant that God has placed nature in bodies, which results in actions, effects and special accidents. As a result, accidents are also God's actions, but through forged nature. Therefore, God has the power to alter the nature of fire so that it no longer burns. Khayat says:

أن معمرا كان يزعم أن هيئات الاجسام فعل للاجسام طباعا، على معنى أن الله هيأها هيئة تفعل هيئاتها طباعا. و كان يزعم مع ذلک أن الله هو الملون للسماء والأرض و لكل ذى لون، بأن فعل تلوينها؟؟

Muammar thought that the origin of an action that emanates from bodies is the nature of forms of bodies, meaning that God formed the bodies in a way that acts according to their inherent traits. He also held the belief that it is God who determined the colors of heaven and

earth and everything that has colors.[29]

According to the above two reports, all the Mu'tazila agree that God can take away the burning property from the fire and give it a cooling effect. Muammar's difference with other Mu'tazila was that Muammar believed that God could do this by altering the nature of fire, whereas other Mu'tazila believed that God directly creates accidents (عرض) such as fire cooling.

Khayat assigns to Ibrahim Nezzam and most human beings that God can adapt and combine things whose nature of essence is incompatible and divided. If God does as such, the nature of those things will change requiring adaptation and union. He says:

فإن ابراهيم كان يزعم أن الله قهر الاشياء المتضادات على الاجتماع الذى ليس فى جوهرها، إذا خليتوماهيعليه،فأماإذامنعتمماهيعليهمنالمنافرة وقهرت على الاجتماع، فإن من جوهرها وشأنها الاجتماع عند القهر لها، كما أن من جوهرها وشأنها المنافره عند تخليتها وما هى عليه، وهذا شى أكثر الخلق شركاء إبراهيم فيه؛

Ibraham Nizzam believed that God forced contradictory things to unite whose essence do not naturally meet up with, but when God stops the things from contradiction and separation which is it’s requisite and forces it to unite, its essence solicits unity, but if God does not interfere, its essence naturally solicits separation. Most people accept this matter stated by Ibrahim Nizzam.[30]

The fourth point of view is based on فاعليت بالاراده, which is accepted by Islamic theologians. Onthe basisof this principle, God is capable of everything that is possible of existence (ممكن الوجود), whether it is creating substance or creating accident, or removing accident and placing another accident in a particular substance. The only thing God cannot do is inherent and logical impossibilities such as the Law of contradictions and the Law

of excluded middle. (اجتماع و ارتفاع نقيضين).Accordingly, it can be argued in favor of the fourth theory that just as a substance like fire and water are ممكن الوجود (possible existent) and require the Creator, their accident and properties, such as heat and burning, wetting and cooling, are also ممكن الوجود and require the Creator. So, God has created the substance of fire and also its accident like special color and burning for it, and just as He can destroy the substance of fire, He can likewise destroy the accident of burning and create the accident of cooling in the fire.

This theory is consistent with the revelations and miracles presented by the prophets. Regarding the case of Ibrahim being hurled into the fire, when God commands the fire to be cool and safe to Ibrahim (a.s.), several conclusions can be drawn from this command. Firstly, prior to God's command, the fire possesses a burning property, Secondly, this characteristic is removed upon God's command. Thirdly, by God's command, fire is given the property of coolness and safety. Fourth, it is this fire that sometimes provides heat and sometimes coolness by God's command, and God does not give direct heat or cold. These four points are consistent only with the fourth theory and are not compatible with the other three theories.

5. Leibniz's view: Now that we have examined the views of Islamic thinkers, it is appropriate totalk about the modern rationalist philosopher Leibniz's (1646–1716) perspective, which is related to the four viewpoints we just looked at.

Leibniz's diverging point is that there is no explanation to show how substances can affect each other, whether this effect is through the interference of substances, or accidental (عرضى) transfer from one substance to another. Here, he is at odds with Aristotle and Ibn Rushd and the view of natural and inherent impact of natural objects on one

another, and agrees with the three other views among Muslim thinkers. Also, like the other three viewpoints, he also believes that God is effective in the changes we see in the world. He says:

It is only God who is the cause of conformity between His phenomena... Otherwise, there is no inner connection between phenomena. Therefore... one's essence is never effective on another person's essence and does not become influenced from another's essence.[31]

But Leibniz believes that God shouldn't interfere directly and momentarily in the world and therefore he criticizes the views of Malebranche and the Occasionalists as well as the Ash'erite and considers their God as God out of the machine.[32] He continues to say:

Because when this is done without providing another explanation for the order of the second causes, it goes back to miracles. In philosophy, we must try to show the way in which things are carried out by divine wisdom by explaining them in accordance with the notion of the subject we are dealing with.[33]

Accordingly, he does not accept the famous view of Muslim philosophers that active intellect is constantly in the state of building up substantial and accidental forms. The view of Imamiyah and Mu'tazila theologians is compatible with his basis that God, with one intervention, has made the Sunnats (His 'way') and miracles occur only occasionally. However, some of his foundations haveprompted a fifth path.

In his most important book, Monadology, he believes that natural objects are composed of monads or individual substances or simple substances or atoms. He says:

Neither substance nor accident can come into a monad from the outside... I also

acknowledge that every created being and, consequently, every created monad is also a subject of change, and even this change is continuous in each of them. From what has been said, it is concluded that the natural changes of monads come from an inner principle because no external cause can affect it internally.[34]

On this basis, if a wood burns in the fire, the wood itself demands that it should burn and the fire has no effect on the burning of wood. Now the question is, why does the wood burn when it's placed in the fire? In response to this question, Leibniz raises God's role and the theory of pre-established harmony. According to this theory, God created a wood that, when placed in the fire, burns at a certain moment. He could have created a wood that wouldn't burn at that precise moment. So at the beginning of creation, God only willed monads that are in harmony with one another and it is only in the case of miracles that He has created uncoordinated monads. For instance, when Ibrahim was thrown into the fire, the monads of Ibrahim's body did not solicit being burned at that moment. He says:

In the simple substances, the effect of one monad on another is an imaginary effect that can only have its effect through the intervention of God, inasmuch as in the ideas of God, a monad rightly demands that God, in regulating the rest from the beginning of things, should have regard to itself. For since it is impossible for a created monad to have a physical influence on the inner nature of another, this is the only way in which one can be dependent on another.[35]

Leibniz's view has at least two main drawbacks: One is that it goes against common sense due to the obvious effects of natural objects. On the other hand, his impediment can be relevant in the first three views among Muslim thinkers, but not in the fourth point

of view, which holds that God makes once the natural laws and miracles are exceptional affairs. In fact, Leibniz has not paid attention to the fourth view. Of course, the fourth view is incompatible with his monadology and the matter that monads cannot affect each other in any way.

However, according to Leibniz, God cannot change the requisites of the monads, rather God can only have a role in selecting the monads and deciding whether or not to create them;and the requisites of the monads are inherent and essential for them.

6. The views of Physicists: At the end of the discussion, it is appropriate to refer to physicists' views on natural causality.

Both Aristotle, who is the founder of ancient natural sciences in the West, and Francis Bacon, a pioneer of modern natural sciences, emphasize that natural sciences seek to discover the laws that govern nature, and this discovery pauses at identifying natural causes.[36] When we recognized via experiments that the cause of water boiling is 100 degrees temperature, thereafter it can be said that every water boils at 100 degrees. Therefore, the presumption of natural scientists is acceptance of natural causality. Of course, it doesn't matter to them whether the natural laws are inherent in things or made by God. What is important and presumptive to them is the existence of natural effects and influences, and they are not concerned with the philosophical source and metaphysical analysis of these effects and influences.

Aristotle's view on the analysis of natural causation was discussed before in the second theory. Now we shall narrate the view of classical physics and quantum physics in this regard. Barbour says about classical physics and quantum physics:

Physics in the 19th century, until the 1890s, consisted of dealing

with and promoting Newtonian mechanics... The physics of the 19th century were algebraic, whether, on the basis of principles and theories, they considered it possible to calculate the future conditions of all systems based on their present state. On the other hand, it was transference or reduction, and they believed that, if not from particle mechanics, at least from the laws governing a few types of particles and their recognition... Between1900 and 1910, there were some astonishing experiments that could only be expressed in non-classical language... In 1913, Bohr developed his famous atomic model, and in his atomic model there was a heavy nucleus around which electrons revolve, and in this rotation, they only pass through orbits that have fragmented or quantized energy. [37]

In classical physics, "if one knows the position and velocity of an object at the initial point in time and is aware of the laws of motion, one can predict the position and velocity of that object at any other time... Laplace positively says: We can consider the current state of the universe to be the effect of its previous state and the cause of its next state... "For such a being, nothing could be uncertain and the future is like the past and is present before his very eyes."[38]

Sometimes the view of classical physics concerning natural causality is called"determinism," "cause-and-effect determinism," or "the principle of causality". Accordingly, there is a necessary relationship between some natural causes and effects based on which the future can surely be predicted.

Of course, it is important to note that even if the theory of determinism is to be accepted, it does not specify whether this necessity comes from the intrinsic nature of natural things or from God, and basically, the physical views do not address metaphysical analysis.

However, physics changed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to the point where the theory of determinism was not only questioned but also rejected. "The research of physicists demonstrated that the state of the particles of atoms cannot be predicted and that they have some kind of a disordered system, and physicists can only convince themselves with probabilities. But the extent of this probability and its uncertainty was not clear until Werner Heisenberg was able to determine the general degree of uncertainty. He believed that there is an inverse relationship between the position of an electron and its velocity, hence, the more accurately the location and position of an electron are measured, the rate and accuracy of predicting its velocity would be reduced to the same extent... The ultimate meaning of the uncertainty principle is that it is not possible to accurately determine both the spatial position and kinetic energy of a particle at the same time... We cannot explain why a particular atom collapses at a particular moment and why it does not collapse at another moment, or what causes that atom to emit its electron in this particular direction and not in the other direction. The principle of uncertainty is one of the most vital stances of the Copenhagen School. Copenhagen school is a special school in physics and philosophy of science that has a specific interpretation of quantum physics. Among the school's followers, we may mention names like Bohr, Heisenberg and Dirac. According to scientists pursuing the Copenhagen school, indeterminacy is a concrete characteristic inherent in nature. According to this theory, it can be concluded that the opportunity for new and unpredictable events in nature is kept open... The most important gnoseological consequence of the principle of uncertainty was the denial of the rule of causality. Heisenberg himself formulated the rule of causality as follows: "*If we know the present precisely, we can*

predict the future." Since Heisenberg denies the existence of scientific laws governing atomic incidents, he believes quantum mechanics confirms the invalidity of causality... The principle of causality is of no usage at the subatomic level, rather it is concerned with statistical probabilities.According to Laplace's definition, the negation of causality results from the principle of causality.Because theoretically, we cannot clearly and conclusively relate the position and velocity of one moment to the position and velocity of another moment it is impossible to determine the position and velocity of each electron or atomic particle at a certain moment in time. Therefore, there is no causality at the subatomic or microscopic level. Sir Arthur Eddington claimed... The principle of uncertainty refers to the possibility of free will... The conclusion to be drawn from the arguments of new science is that in 1927, religion for the first time became acceptable to a rational and scientific scholar. Some proposed that atomic indeterminacy is the very domain in which God governs the universe with His Will. William Pollard believed that in every quantum incident, the Will of God decides which of the quantum possibilities would be effectuated. God influences events without acting in the form of a physical force. Since an electron does not have a specific place in a combination of states, God is needless of a force to actualize a potential state from among the substitute potentials, and God dominates all events by directing numerous atoms with his own Will. Some contemporary scientists even believe that one cannot ignore the possibility of non-physical factors being at work.

John Babel, a Canadian mathematician says: Assuming that one can provethat atomic events do not have a physical cause, but this opens the door to the possibility of non-physical causes. These causes can be human minds, incorporeal

beings such as angels and demons, and even the action of God's own system. These non-physical factors, by definition, are beyond scientific investigation. Therefore, from a scientific standpoint, we are not permitted to claim that there is no kind of cause at all if there is no physical cause.[39]

Einstein and some physicists like Bohm opposed the Copenhagen school and reckoned that the uncertainty in quantum is related to our ignorance, not the absence of causality. Einstein's famous sentence was: "I don't believe God plays dice with the universe."[40]

To summarize the theories of physicists with respect to natural causality, the following points can be stated:

1.The principle of causality is the obvious and rational principle and empirical observationscannotreject it.

2.The necessityaspect of causality isn't one of the prerequisitesof the principle of causality such that by rejecting the necessity clause of causality, the principle of causality is rejected. According to the theory of *Allah'sSunnah*, natural causation does exist, but not the necessity aspect.

3.The incalculability of certain natural affairs in physics can have various causes, including our ignorance or absence of appropriate means of measurement or God's interventionbased onthe theory of *Allah'sSunnah*.

4.Based on the problem of inductive reasoning, empirical science never accomplishes perfect science and decisive general rules.

5.Assuming that physicists attain natural causes and laws, they cannot examine the origin of these laws and whether they are intrinsic or made, or provide a metaphysical analysis of it, because this task is done by rational method, not experimental method, and the physicists don't possess the devices for such a work.

6.In the event that we don't acknowledge the principle of causality, we must dismiss empirical sciences, because the laws of nature are based on causality, no empirical research can be conducted on the basis of luck, chance, and accident.

Endnotes:

[1]It means the form and structure of an object or thing; a kind of order and structure that shapes and determines the object.

[2]ʿARAŻ, a term of philosophy meaning "accident." Accident is contrasted with substance and according to the famous definition, it is "the essence that needs a subject to exist." It does not mean an "accident" as used in common speech, a chance incident, normally harmful. Examples of accidents are color, taste, movement and stagnation.

[3] Ash'ari, al-Luma, page 39.

[4] Malebranche, Elucidations of the search after truth, p. 657.

[5] Ghazali, *Tahāfutal-Falāsifa*, p.225

[6] The search after truth, p. 448

[7] Ghazali, *Tahāfutal-Falāsifa*, p.226

[8] Ibid, p.231

[9] Ibid, p.448

[10] Ibn-Rushd, *Tahāfutal-Tahāfut, p.290*

[11] Ibid, p.291

[12] Aristotle, Metaphysics, p.344 and 347.

[13] Ibid, p.294.

[14] Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-Maqal, p.31-32 and 16.

[15] Sura Anbiyah, verse 69.

[16] Raazi Tehrani, Risala al-Ta'liqat, p.10

[17]Ebrahimi Dinani, General philosophical rules in Islamic philosophy, vol. 1, p. 21.

[18]«علت معدّ»is something that provides the basis for the realization of the effect, in such a case, even if the cause disappears, the effect is steadfast and stable.

[19]The real cause is something that the effect is really dependent on and always accompanies the effect.

[20] M.M. Sharif, History of Philosophy in Islam, v.1, p.659 narrating from Al-Thamarat'ul-Marzi'a Fi ba'za'l Risalaat al-Farabia, p. 72

[21] Refer to Ibn Sina, Al-Isharat, v.3, p.413, 417 & 418.

[22].. و أما الطريق الى العلم بأنه من فعله تعالى، فهو بأن يكون من جنس لا يقدر عليه العباد كالحياة و الجسم،

أو يقع على وجه مخصوص لا يقدر على ايقاعه عليه العباد، كنتقل الجبال و فلق البحر، و الكلام الخارق للعادة بفصاحته. و أما اشتراطنا أن يكون خارقة للعادة فهو لأنه اذا لم يكن كذلک لم نعلم أنه مفعول التصديق المدعى، و جوزنا أن يكون فعل بمجرى العادة. ألا ترى أن المدعى للنبوة لو جعل دلالة صدقه

طلوع الشمس من مشرقها و طلعت منه، لم يكن ذلک دلالة على صدقه، و لو جعل دلالة صدقه طلوعها من المغرب فطلعت كذلک لدلت من هذا الوجه، و لا فرق بينهما إلا ما ذكرناه. و أما الطريق إلى معرفة كونه خارقة للعادة، فهو أن العادات معلومة مستقرة بين العقلاء، و طريق علمها المشاهدة أو الأخبار، و قد علم العقلاء أن العادة ما جرت بطلوع الشمس من المغرب، و لا بخلق ولد من غير ذكر و انثى، فاذا انتقض ذلک و تغير فهو خرق عادة (شريف مرتضى، الذخيرة فى علم الكلام، ص ٣٢٨-٣٢٩).

[23] Safi Golpayegani, An Approach to Philosophy and Mysticism.

[24]Jāḥiẓ, Rasa'il al-Jahiz, p.65

[25]Ash'ari, *Maqālāt al-IslāmīyīnWa'kḫtilāfal-Muṣallīn,* p.569-570.

[26] Abdul-Jabbar, Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsah, p.256

[27] Baghdadi, Al-Farq bayn al-Firaq, p.94

[28] Ibid, p.198-199

[29] Khayat, Al-Entesar, p.100

[30]Ibid, p.91. In finding the views of the Mu'tazila, I have utilized the article "Miracles and Extraordinary occurrences from the viewpoint of the Mu'tazila", written by Sayyid Muhammad Alemi and Mohammad Taghi Sobhani, from the Research Journal of Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom in 2010 no. 33, p.153-176.

[31] Leibniz, Philosophical writing, p.27 (Discourse on Metaphysics).

[32] Deus ex Machina

[33] Ibid, p.122 (New System, and Explanation of the New System).

[34] Leibniz, Monadology and few other articles, translated by Abdul Karim Rashidiyan, p. 166 & 167.

[35] Leibniz, Monadology and few other articles, p. 176.

[36] Refer to Aristotle, Metaphysics, p.29; Jahangiri, Status, works and opinions of Francis Becon, p.78-82

[37] Barbour, Science and Religion, translation of Bahauddin Khuramshahi, p. 311.

[38]Kiankhah, "An investigation into the conflict between Causality Law and the Principle of Uncertainty", No. 36-37, p.118-119.

[39] Ibid, p.119-124.

[40] Ibid, p.125.